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**The affirmative’s hegemonic subjectivity relies on western conceptions of the end of history**

**Spanos, 2000** (William V., Prof. of Comparative Lit @ Suny-Binghamton, America’s Shadow, pgs. xvii-xviii)

This accommodational strategy of representation, for example, is epitomized by Richard Haass, a former official in the Bush adminis- tration and now director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, in his book The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (1997).4 Eschewing Fukuyama's Hegelian eschatologi- cal structure in favor of theorizing the actual practices of the United States in the international sphere — Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Iraq, and so forth — Haass frames the post-Cold War conjuncture in the totalizing image of a "deregulated world" (in contrast to the world "regulated" by the Cold War scenario) and the role of the United States in the trope of a sheriff leading posses (the appropriate members of the United Nations) to quell threats to global stability and peace posed by this international deregulation. Despite Haass's acknowledgment that conflict is inevitable (which, in fact, echoes Fukuyama), the triumphant idea of liberal capi- talist democracy remains intact in his discourse. That is, his commitment to the "laissez-faire" polity (deregulation) — to the fictional concept of the sovereign subject — continues to be grounded in the metaphysics that informed America's global errand in the "wilderness" of Southeast Asia. Indeed, Haass gives this representational framework far more his- torical power than Fukuyama's disciplinary discourse of political science is able to muster. For, unlike the Fukuyamans, Haass informs his repre- sentation of the United States's historically determined and determining exceptionalist mission in the post-Cold War era with the teleological metaphorics that have been from the beginning fundamental to the con- stitution and power of the American globally oriented national identity. The metaphor of the sheriff/posse derives from the history of the Amer- ican West and constitutes a variation of the pacification processes of westward expansion. As such it brings with it the entire baggage of the teleological metanarrative of the American frontier from the Puri- tans' "errand in the ['New World'] wilderness" to the myth of Manifest Destiny. As the "New Americanist" countermemory has persuasively shown, this is the myth that has saturated the cultural discourse of America, both high and low, since its origins: whether in the form of the American jeremiad, which, from the Puritans through Daniel Webster to Ronald Reagan, has always functioned to maintain the national con- sensus vis-a-vis its providentially ordained mission to domesticate (and dominate) what is beyond the frontier5 or in the form of the Hollywood western, which has functioned to naturalize what one New American- ist has called the American "victory culture."6 Reconstellated into this context, Haass's more "realistic" analysis of the post-Cold War oc- casion comes to be seen not simply as continuous with Fukuyama's, but as a more effective imperial global strategy. The utter immunity to criticism of the Clinton administration's "humanitarian" war against Serbia in the spring of 1999 — which perfectly enacted the Haassian scenario — bears witness to this. In the following chapters of this book I will, by and large, refer to Fukuyama's version of the post-Cold War American end-of-history discourse. But I wish to make it clear at the beginning that, in doing so, I am referring not to a particular theory, but to a fundamental American tradition whose theorization extends from de Tocqueville through Frederick Jackson Turner to Fukuyama and Haass.

**This metaphysical grounding justifies extermination and makes their epistemology suspect**

**Spanos 5** (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, “Humanism and Studia Humanitatis after 9/11/01: Rethinking the Anthropologos,” published in symploke volume 13 number 1-2)

In 1991, following the disintegration and demise of the Soviet Union and its empire, Francis Fukuyama published an essay (later expanded to book length) which announced "the end of history" and the advent of a "new [global] world order" under the aegis of American liberal capitalist democracy.4 This annunciation was justified by appealing not to history but to History, that is, to a Hegelian/Kojèvian ontology which assumes that history is characterized by a directional dialectic process that, in the end, precipitates a world in which historical contradictions have been sublimated into a harmonious and conflict free totality. To arrive at this Quixotically optimistic and brutally reductive—world picture, Fukuyama, as Derrida and others have shown,5 was compelled by the binarist logic of this metaphysical ontology, this representation of history from after or above its disseminations (meta ta physika)—to overlook and discount the volatility that has characterized modern history, and, more important, the violence that the West, not least America, has perpetrated to produce this global volatility. I am not simply referring to the sustained practice of Western imperialism vis a vis its "Other" that began in the heady age of exploration. This was the predatory history that bore witness to the virtual extinction of the natives of North and South America, the African slave trade, the ruthless colonization and exploitation of the Middle East and India, and the destabilization of China and Japan, and, in its culminating phase, to the wholesale slaughter of World War I and, following World War II, to the carnage of the "small" hot wars of the Cold War, not least the one undertaken by the United States in Southeast Asia, in the name of "saving" it for "the free world," a "hot war" during which approx-imately two million Vietnamese were killed, their land destroyed by bombs and chemicals, their rice culture shattered, and their organic community reduced to a society of refugees. I am also referring to the modern Western interpretation of being, which was simultaneous and indissolubly complicitous with this devastating global imperial practice: specifically, its supplanting of the Word of the Christian God (the theo-logos) by the Word of Man—the anthropologos—as the measure of all things, spatial and temporal, and the mode of inquiry and learning endemic to this apotheosis of Man which came to be called humanist studies, Studia Humanitatis. Subsequent world historical events—not least the rise of a militant Islamic reaction to American hegemony in the Middle East—have subverted Fukuyama's euphoric vision of the new world order presided over by American capitalist democracy. This subversion of Fukuyama's secularized evangelical "good news" was epitomized by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11/01, perpetrated by Al Qaeda, which, ironically, had been financed by a United States inexorably and blindly bent on securing its "interests" in that oil-rich, geopolitically sensitive, and, therefore, unstable part of the world. But the discourse of the conservative dominant culture that has taken center stage in the aftermath of 9/11 in the eyes of the American government and the media remains committed to the essentialist binarist ontology and the "secularized" humanism that underlies Fukuyama's end-of-history thesis. It has either accommodated these flagrant historical contradictions to its universalist humanist perspective, as in the case of Richard Haass's The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (1997). Or, as in the case of Samuel Huntington, it has proclaimed Fukuyama's annunciation of the end of history as premature. In keeping with the neoconservatives' anxiety over the disappearance in the wake of the end of the Cold War of an enemy that is the necessary condition of America's global hegemony, it has replaced the Cold War between liberal capitalist democracy and communism by the "clash of civilizations," the West (for Huntington, the "Anglo-Protestant" American national identity) versus the East (Islam).6 In either case, the essential configuration of the Fukuyaman Hegelian/Kojèvian "vision" or, to adapt Althusser, the anthropological problematic, remains intact. Both are subsumed by "a definite theoretical [visual] structure" in which "the sighting is thus no longer the act of an individual subject, endowed with the faculty of vision' which he exercises either attentively or distractedly; the sighting is the act of its structural conditions. . . . It is literally no longer the eye (the mind's eye) of a subject which sees what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic: it is this field itself which sees itself in the object or problems it defines; the sighting being merely the necessary reflection of the field on its object." Analogously, this problematic "defines and structures the invisible as the defined excluded, excluded from the field of visibility and defined as excluded by the existence and peculiar structure of the field of the problematic; as what forbids and represses the reflection of the field on its object" (Althusser & Balibar 1979, 25-26). That is to say, this humanist problematic continues to see only that which it itself, independent of the agent, allows to be seen, that which confirms its legitimacy. Everything outside its anthropological structure remains invisible.

**This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence**

**Burke, 7** (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action**.** The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**The alternative is to vote negative to embrace ontological exile – only a rethinking of thinking itself can break the shackles of Western hegemonic dominance**

**Spanos 2000** (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2000, “America’s Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire,” page 192-3)

Reconstellated into the context of this Heideggerian diagnosis of mo­dernity, the American end-of-history discourse undergoes a resonant estrangement. What is euphorically represented as "good news" — the global fulfillment ("end") of the emancipatory promise of History —comes to be seen as the Pax Metaphysica: the colonization of the errant mind of humanity at large by a banal and banalizing thinking that has reduced everything, including human beings, to "standing [or dispos­able] reserve."2 This "end of philosophy" in the form of a "triumphant" instrumentalist thinking that has reduced being to disposable commod­ity is everywhere manifest in the post–Cold War era. And, I suggest, its most telling symptom is the globalization of (American) English as the lingua franca of the "free market," which has as one of its most dev­astating consequences the "Americanization" not simply of the Western nation-states but of entire Third World cultures. What for the purpose of my argument this global triumph of "Amer­ican" thinking means is that even those who would oppose American global hegemony are, insofar as they remain indifferent to the onto­logical grounds of its sociopolitical practices, condemned to think their opposition according to the imperatives of the discursive practices they would oppose. They thus fulfill the expectation of the deputies of Amer­ican culture who predict that "even nondemocrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the sin­gle universal standard."3 That is to say, the fulfillment of the European metanarrative in the globalization of American technological thinking, that is, the Americanization of the planet, has tacitly reduced opposition to a resonant silence. It is in this sense that, with Heidegger, the intellectual who is attuned to the complicity between Western philosophy and imperialism is com­pelled to call this "age of the world picture" presided over by America a "destitute time" or, more suggestively, "a realm of in-between" — "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming."4 In the context of the impasse of oppositional thinking, in other words, he/she is compelled to acknowledge the time of the post—Cold War occasion as an interregnum. This, for an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat. But for the opposi­tional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking—the "shadow" that haunts its light — that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the marginalized intellectual is the re­thinking of thinking itself. And, as I have suggested, it is the event of the Vietnam War—and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it — that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible.

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

**Cred**

**No impact to credibility**

**Tang 5** – Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62

The general validity of reputation, however, has come under assault. Whereas in 1961 Glenn Snyder touted the virtue of drawing the line in places such as Quemoy and Matsu,4 he later all but acknowledged the flaw of his logic.5 Likewise, a decade after claiming that "a state can usually convince others of its willingness to defend its vital interests by frequently fighting for interests others believe it feels are less than vital,"6 Jervis was no longer so sure in 1982: "We cannot predict with great assurance how a given behavior will influence others' expectations of how the state will act in the future."7 This assault on reputation remains anathema for most politicians (and many political scientists). As statesman Henry Kissinger warned his colleagues, "No serious policymaker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of 'prestige,' or 'honor\* or 'credibility.'"8 Judging from politicians' rhetoric and behavior, Kissinger's advice has been well taken. There seems to be a gap, therefore, between politicians' persistent obsession with reputation and scholars' increasing doubt about reputation's importance, and that gap is widening. Several more recent studies have taken the case against reputation (and credibility) even further.9 Compared to previous studies, these tend to be **more systematic and better grounded empirically**. They can be divided into two categories. The first group of work focuses on the impact of politicians' concern for reputation on state behavior and concludes that the concern for reputation has had a profound influence on state behavior in conflicts.10 The second group of work, taking politicians' belief in reputation as a fact, argues that this belief is unjustified because reputation in international conflicts is difficult, if not impossible, to develop. To put it differently, this line of work contends that reputation actually does not matter as much as politicians usually believe, if it matters at all.11

**No impact to hegemony**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**Plan can’t solve multilat and public backlash takes out solvency**

**Lake 10** (Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//NG

At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, **other countries** will have to make **serious and integral contributions** to the collective effort. **Both sides** to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. **Other countries**, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. **Americans are likely to resist** the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact.

**Litany of alt causes**

**Burgsdorff 9** (Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, **together with** other measures such as closing **Guantanamo**, signing up to the **Kyoto Protocol** and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the **Bali conference**, and possibly, joining the **International Criminal Court** as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the **1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child**, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

**Our cooperation will not be value neutral – American foreign policy is overdetermined by the logic of integration which will view the plan as a concession and expect compliance with whatever our next foreign policy goal is – if the countries they cooperate with don’t follow US command they will suffer the consequences**

**Campbell, 7** - International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University (David, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy” 2007)

It is important to highlight the way performativity’s idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of America’s relationship to the world. Signiﬁed by the notion of **integration** we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to **draw countries into its** spheres of inﬂuence and control. We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been **enunciated** over the last 15 years through popular-**academic books, think-tank documents, policy programmes and security strategies**, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of **representation and coercion** that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else **suffer the consequences**. As such, we are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile geographies of exclusion.

**The total expulsion of all violence from the rational order of the system is synonymous with a totalizing monopoly on violence. Even this, however, will crumble at the hands of an anonymous and ironic negativity.**

**Baudrillard 98** (Jean Baudrillard, your worst nightmare, “Paroxysm: Interviews with Philippe Petit,” pp 65-6)

It's a diagnosis. Our society has expelled violence (at the same time as it has expelled evil, illness, negativity and death – I don't mean it has eliminated them, but it has expelled them from its system of values). All forms of wildcat, spontaneous violence, historical and political, have been stifled or neutralized. Just as all forms of concrete freedom are being absorbed into the only freedom which remains, the freedom of the market and of market values, and the assumption of these into glob­alism, so all forms of violence are reduced and muzzled to the exclusive advantage of the terrorist and police-style violence of the new world order. The system has the monopoly of violence: a monopoly of the extermination of any singularity, any negativity, of death itself, and of real violence in the virtual violence of generalized pacification, fundamentalist [intégriste] violence (the only violence, that of the sys­tem, not that of terrorists, which remains small-scale and blind). ¶ Against this, new forms of violence are arising; or, rather, new forms of anony­mous, anomalous virulence – a reactive, reactional vehemence against the dominant thrust of society, against any dominant system – which is no longer a historical vio­lence of liberation, but a violence from the confines of a sacrificed destiny, from the confines of a sacrificed symbolic order, from the confines of the perfect crime or, in other words, of total integration (the integrism of the system) and even of the democratic aspects of the system (enforced liberation, enforced interactivity in all its forms) – that is to say, the absence of destiny. This new violence is no longer directed against the absence of freedom and against oppression, but against the absence of destiny and the democratic leukaemia of all our cells.

**OAS**

**OAS fails**

**a) Lacks enforcement**

**Welch 12** – CPA/IIGG Research Associate (Emma Welch, “Sustaining the Peace in Latin America: Regional and International Efforts” Council on Foreign Relations, May 16 2012, IIGGMeetingNote\_SustainingthePeaceinLatinAmerica.pdf)

However, the ability of the OAS to play a more proactive, visible, and effective role in the region is limited by at least three factors. First, it has no explicit mandate for conflict prevention. Although a legal framework exists to mediate interstate differences and crises, the OAS is still overwhelmingly guided by principles of nonintervention and national sovereignty. Without an appeal to the OAS Permanent Council and broad consensus, the OAS has little power to act. Second, the OAS lacks the requisite tools, funding, and field expertise, to say nothing of deployable military or police forces. Finally, the OAS navigates an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. It struggles to gain legitimacy and credibility in the region, given the perception that the United States continues to control the strings behind the scenes.

**b) Administration and finances**

**Hakim 12** - President Emeritus and Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, member of the CFR, Master of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School (Peter Hakim, “The OAS in Trouble, Again,” Inter-American Dialogue, 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3167)

According to a bipartisan group of four influential Senators—Democrats John Kerry and Robert Menendez and Republicans Richard Lugar and Marco Rubio—the Organization of American States is “sliding into an administrative and financial paralysis” that is threatening to condemn it to “irrelevance.” This is the substance of a Nov 14 letter that the senators sent to the president of the OAS governing council. And the four senators, all of whom hold leadership positions on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are right. The OAS is poorly managed, its finances are precarious, and it lacks a guiding vision. It has displayed shortcomings in conducting its core responsibilities, including the defense of democracy, human rights, and press freedom. Unfairly, however, the senators neglect to mention any OAS accomplishments or strengths—or note that none of the cited problems are new. The Inter-American Dialogue’s founder, Sol Linowitz (a former OAS ambassador himself), depicted the organization as “ignored, forgotten, and irrelevant,” and that was a generation ago. It is hard to recall a time that the OAS has been held in high regard. Betting on Brazil, July 27, 2012. The senators also omitted from their portrayal some crucial facts about the inner workings of the organization. The OAS is a creature of 34 governments—including the US government, and is able to take action only when they all substantially agree. The OAS can only be as effective as the governments want it to be. More than anything, the OAS’s troubles today mirror the deep divisions among Latin American nations and between them and the US. Most governments are not taking the OAS seriously. Some are plainly hostile. Riled by a decision of the OAS Human Rights Commission, Brazil has kept its representative at home for the past 18 months. Argentina has not designated an ambassador to the OAS for three years. For some time, Venezuela has been a disruptive presence in the organization. Even as it finances 60 percent of the OAS budget and plays host to the organization, the US has adopted a largely reflexive role. Some consider it AWOL.

**b) US hegemony only undermines cred further**

**Isacson, 12 –** senior associate for regional security at the Washington Office on Latin America (Adam, “Conflict Resolution in the Americas: The Decline of the OAS” World Politics Review, 5/22, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11979/conflict-resolution-in-the-americas-the-decline-of-the-oas)

Where these trends are headed, though, is not clear. Reduced U.S. hegemony, for instance, could mean greater credibility for the OAS, which for so long was viewed as dominated by Washington. On the other hand, the region's sharp ideological and political divisions could continue to render the organization inoperable. The next big test for the OAS will be its ability to chart an independent path on drug policy. In the face of increasing criticism of the U.S. approach, the region's leaders decided at their April 2012 summit to charge the OAS with producing a document laying out the pros and cons of alternative policies. For the OAS, the stakes are high: If its document ends up simply ratifying the status quo under heavy U.S. pressure, the damage to the organization’s credibility will be significant.

**Economic engagement is an imperialist tool used to forward US geopolitical dominance – economic influence perpetuates the North/South geographical divide which makes war inevitable**

**Jones, Jones, and Woods, 4** (Martin Jones\* - PhD in Human Geography from the University of Manchester, Rhys Jones; Professor of Human Geography at the University

of Wales Aberystwyth\*\* - Professor in Human Geography @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, Michael Woods\*\*\* - PhD in Human Geography from Bristol University; Professor of Human Geography and Director of the Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, 2004, “AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY Space, place and politics”, http://118.97.161.124/perpus-fkip/Perpustakaan/Geography/Geografi%20manusia/Pengantar%20Geografi%20Politik.pdf) MD

Political domination can take on many forms. At¶ its most basic and uncompromising, it is based on¶ military relationships between two or more parties.¶ Much of the rationale behind the proliferation of¶ nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for instance,¶ was based upon the West and the East’s need to secure¶ strategic military and, therefore, political advantage¶ over their enemies. This became the main justiﬁcation¶ for the global political and military face-off between¶ East and West that characterised the international¶ relations of the Cold War. A more recent example has been the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan¶ over the disputed province of Kashmir (Dodds 2000:¶ 103–6). Once again, overt displays of the military¶ might of the two countries have been used as a means¶ of securing strategic, military and political advantage¶ within the region. Political forms of geopolitical¶ domination can also occur in more subtle and hidden¶ ways. A good instance of this is the persistent military¶ inﬂuence of the United States in neighbouring countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America ¶ (see Dodds 2000: 57). The most infamous examples ¶ of these more covert efforts by the United States to¶ influence the internal politics of other independent¶ states have been in Guatemala, Nicaragua and **Cuba**.¶ These latter examples also begin to demonstrate the¶ strong connections between political and economic¶ aspects of geopolitical strategy, where political interference is accompanied by various forms of **financial**¶ **aid**. A key method of securing geopolitical inﬂuence¶ and dominance in recent years has been the ﬁnancial¶ and technological aid offered by dominant countries to¶ other, needy countries. In many ways, if military might represents the ‘stick’ of international relations, then¶ ﬁnancial aid is the ‘carrot’. Numerous examples exist¶ to demonstrate the role of economic influence in¶ shaping international geopolitical relations. In the¶ period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for¶ instance, there was much debate in the international¶ community concerning the best way to secure the¶ freedom of the latter. Much of the political shenanigans¶ of the period took place in the corridors of the United¶ Nations in New York. The famous journalist John¶ Pilger (1992) has noted how the United States tried¶ to use its economic muscle as a way of securing the¶ support of other states for its plan to mount an invasion¶ of Kuwait and Iraq. In this respect, its main efforts were¶ directed towards the non-permanent members of the¶ Security Council of the United Nations, which, at that¶ time, included one of the poorest states in the world,¶ Yemen. It is a little-known fact that Yemen voted not¶ to support an invasion of the Middle East by American led UN forces. In the immediate aftermath of the vote,¶ it is alleged by Pilger (1992), the Yemeni ambassador¶ to the United Nations was informed by his US counterpart that that was the most costly decision he¶ had ever made. In the following weeks, $70 million of¶ proposed US aid to Yemen was cancelled, the World¶ Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to¶ question the economic practices of the Yemeni state¶ and 800,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi¶ Arabia. As Dodds (2000) has argued, occurrences such as¶ these are part of a broader range of economic strategies¶ that help certain Northern states to achieve geopolitical¶ dominance over Southern countries. The influence ¶ of industrialised countries over institutions such as ¶ the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and ¶ the World Trade Organisation has been particularly¶ important. It has helped to generate an additional ¶ layer of compliance within international relations. The¶ best example of this process is the so-called ‘structural¶ adjustment programmes’ of the World Bank, which¶ seek to constrain the range of economic and political¶ policies that can be pursued by less industrialised¶ countries (Dodds 2000: 17; see also Krasner 2001:¶ 28–9). The criticism levelled at these programmes is¶ that they reify a particularly industrialised model of¶ development on southern states and, as such, represent¶ **a new form of informal imperialism by northern states.** In many ways, these examples illustrate the strong¶ connections between geopolitics and the broader international political economy (see Agnew and Corbridge¶ 1995).¶

**The affirmative’s discourse of “failed states” legitimizes an interventionist epistemology that effaces difference, makes north-south inequality inevitable, and is self-fulfilling**

**Eisenträger 12** (Stian Eisenträger, MA student in IR, board member at International Reporter, a Norwegian NGO, 3-27-12, “Failed State or Failed Label?: The Concealing Concept and the Case of Somalia,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/failed-state-or-failed-label-the-concealing-concept-and-the-case-of-somalia/>) gz

The end of the Cold War shaped a new international political context where the issues of democracy and human rights were brought out from the internal to the external scene. The weakened role of the Soviet Union gave the United States the possibility to increase its global influence. In this context *the absence of effective government* emerged on the world political agenda together with the concept of the “failed state” (Akpinarli 2009). Boutros Boutros-Gali and Kofi Annan, the former Secretaries-General of the UN, used the “failed state” term as early as in 1990, although the General Assembly or the Security Council never used it. Somalia, which was a typical case of the absence of effective government, was described by the UN without the use of the term “failed state”. The concept was then applied for the first time in the article “Saving Failed States” published in the winter edition of Foreign Policy Magazine in 1992-1993 (Helman & Ratner). This article, which was written in the post-Cold War context with its high aspirations for democracy, human rights, the more active role of the United Nations in safeguarding collective security and the emergence of the United States’ as the leading agenda-setting actor, established the basic concept and the paradigm. Although some have tried to incorporate “failed states” in international law, the term is highly debated because of the neo-colonial notion attached to it (Akpinarli 2009, 87-89). According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word “fail” can have a range of different meanings: “to lose strength”, “to fade or die away”, “to stop functioning normally”, “to fall short”, “to be or become absent or inadequate”, “to be unsuccessful” and “to become bankrupt or insolvent” (Merriam-Webster 2011). Thus, I would argue that the word is too imprecise to be meaningful in our attempt to broaden our understanding of the world. In addition, the word is heavily value-laden and has loads of negative connotations attached to it, and therefore I find it unsuitable to use in science. That journalists and politicians still use the term, which is both catchy and tabloid, is understandable when we take into consideration the rather brutal limitations of time and space these two occupational groups have in their struggle to reach their audiences. Nevertheless, numbers of scholars have used and still use the failed state label, many even without engaging critically with the term (Bates 2008; Ghani & Lockhart 2008; Holzgrefe & Keohane 2003, just to mention a few). The urge to “fix”: Securitization and intervention The failed state paradigm implies that there is something that needs to be “fixed” or “saved” – of course by “good” liberal democratic external forces. “Preventing states from failing, and rescuing those that do fail, are (…) strategic and moral imperatives”, Robert I. Rotberg (2002) proclaims in an article with the dramatic title “Failed States in a World of Terror” (the argument is elaborated in his book, bearing the same title). One can feel the notion of “the white mans burden”. One of the most neoliberal contributions in the failed states debate is probably that of Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart (2008, 124) who in their book “Fixing failed states” boldly declare that “today states must fulfil their citizens’ aspirations for inclusion and development and also carry out a constellation of interrelated functions”. They conclude that states “in the world today” should perform ten key functions, which are: 1) Rule of law; 2) A monopoly of the legitimate means of violence; 3) Administrative control; 4) Sound management of public finances; 5) Investments in human capital; 6) Creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 7) Provision of infrastructure services; 8) Formation of a market; 9) Management of public assets; 10) Effective public borrowing. So now when we have the list, can we just go out in the world and start “fixing”? Fixing “failed states” is a dangerous exercise: For many policymakers the failed state label contributes to open up for and make a good excuse for military and other interventions. Petra Minnerop shows how the US throughout the second half of the 20th century developed several terms, for example “rogue states”, for “states to which it ascribed a high threat potential as regards the United States and international security” (2003). In the years to follow after the 1992 article in Foreign Policy Magazine the international community, with the US in the leading role, carried out military interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis that the chaotic situation in these states poses a threat to the US and international security in general. The terms “failed state”, “rogue state” and “war on terror” have all been given prominent roles in the public debate. As Akpinarli also remarks, these concepts have been invented by the North to “solve” problems in the South, as well as to advocate for and justify military interventions to protect international peace and security (Akpinarli 2009). I would argue that the concept rather causes more trouble than it solves – not only in terms of military intervention, but also by keeping “failed” states in the margins of international relations. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the labelling of “failed states” is a prime example of what the Copenhagen School of Security has dubbed *securitization*. The founding fathers of this concept point out that “a discourse that takes form of presenting something to an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). The audience – in this instance, ordinary citizens in the North – has to a large extent accepted the “failed state” paradigm, especially with reference to Somalia. Both the media and the large organizations working with/in/for the “failed state” are acting as agents for the securitizing actors – that is the governments in the North, especially the United States’ government. Somalia has been among the top five on the list since the first Failed States Index was published in 2005, and since 2008 Somalia has had the dubious honour of being the world’s “most failed state”. Whether it is possible to measure a state’s “failure” is a question that probably requires a book to be answered. Since 2005 the magazine and Fund for Peace have ranked the world’s countries after measuring the following variables: Demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace 2011). No doubt that all these measurements may give a good indicator of how the situation is in a number of countries. However, my point and critique is that the index fails in grasping the vast empirical variations within the research object itself in the case of Somalia. Using the juridical state of Somalia as the object of analysis without looking under the surface becomes a serious hindrance of capturing the full picture. Somalia’s image problem As Michael C. Williams (2003, 527) excellently points out, “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics”. In this context we can identify the visualization of the verbal rhetoric of the failed state paradigm. The presentation of ”failed states” is often accompanied with depictions of a war-torn hell-hole, and the Foreign Policy Magazine takes the lead by presenting the Failed States Index together with a collection of photos appearing under the splash heading: “Postcards from Hell” (Foreign Policy Magazine 2011). When the Failed States Index is referred to by other news outlets, this kind of presentation is reproduced (for a recent example, see: BBC 2011a). I have yet to see an example of any media organization to examine the Index more closely. Only telling one side of the story is a serious problem. We can compare the use of the “failed state” label with how Somalia is depicted in the daily media coverage. How many times can you remember to have seen the pictures from Somalia, the disaster zone, with starving children, heavily armed Islamist fighters and dead people being dragged through the streets by a cheering mob? Quite a few times, I suppose. On the other hand, how many times have you seen pictures from Somalia showing farmers working in their fields, smiling and playful children, or the beach in Mogadishu crowded with both men, women and children? Probably not at all. Of course, the pictures of the disaster zone of Somalia are real and by every journalistic standard it is right to publish such pictures. The practice becomes a problem when these are the only pictures that are being shown, when the stories about starving children and dangerous terrorists are the only stories that are being told about Somalia outside Somalia. This misrepresentation in the media can for a large part be attributed to the “failed state” label that is burn-marked on the country, and which pay so little attention to the variations within the geographical area that makes up the state of Somalia. When a statement is repeated enough times, it becomes a “truth”. Politicians and scholars, as well as the media itself are responsible for this brand marking, and the process is self-reinforcing. The situation has reached the point where members of the Somali diaspora community in Norway has established an organization with one of its main goals to adjust the picture that has been made of Somalia and the Somali people (Iftiin – somalisk-norsk kunnskapssenter 2011). Somalia has a serious image-problem – literally. Not only does this put the country in risk of external intervention, it also contributes to keep Somalia and much of its population in the margins of international relations. There is a lack of representation of the people inhabiting the territory of the Somali Republic, both because the TFG lacks authority, but also because of the non-recognition of the de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland. Here we have to functional geopolitical entities that are not represented in the UN nor in other global or regional institutions. Furthermore foreign investors and tourists stay away because of the perception and understanding of the whole of Somalia being a ”failed state”. Africaand the Knowledge of Non-Being In his classic work Orientalism, Edward Said (2003 [1978]) scrutinize the history and nature of Western attitudes towards the East. He argues that orientalism is a powerful European ideological creation and a way for dealing with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs. Achille Mbembe applies much of the same argumentation in his critique of Africanism. He says that historically, the West has constructed its own civilization, enlightenment and progress through the “others”, thus non-Western cultures, and especially Africa. Mbembe argues that: “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and still continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Mbembe 2001, 2). One of the challenges in grasping how things work outside the Western world is that many, if not even all, of the concepts we use when describing the universe of International Relations is based in Western history and thinking. Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber et al. 1991, 78). In Western thinking, Weber’s definition represents the *idea* of an “ideal state”, and it seems like many have the perception that Western states fit into this idea or norm. When analyzing states in Africa, this is revealed when African states are compared with the *idea* of an “ideal state”, which is believed to be a prototype of a Western state – leading to the focus on African states’ absences, lacks and incompleteness, as weak or failed. In this way Mbembe’s analysis is straight to the point when he states that “while we feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies, and economies *are not*, we still know absolutely nothing about *what they actually are*”. Our knowledge of Africa is to a large degree based on the knowledge of non-being (Mbembe 2001, 9). But claiming that the “Western state” resembles the Weberian state, or even that the “Western state” is the norm, is highly problematic. First of all, every state has its own specific features, and the higher the degree of generalization, the more problematic it is. Secondly, Weber’s state is an idea of a state that has never existed in practice – even not in Europe or North America – for example when we take into account the important fact that private violence and private security has existed through modern history, and even today. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010), Colás & Mabee (2010) and Thomson (1994) are among several scholars who have demonstrated how private violence and private security takes form in e.g. private companies, criminal organizations and vigilante groups. If the states in Europe and North America are to be judged by the same standards as the states in Africa, many of these could get the “failed” label as well. Noam Chomsky, for example, has turned the tables in his book “Failed States”, where he shows that the US shares features with other “failed states” (2007). But does the “failed state” label provide us with more and better insight into how different states work; does it enlighten us in any way? Definitely not. The label conceals more than it enlightens. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010) argues that we must look beyond the state when analysing security issues in Africa. I would argue that we must look both beyond and within the state also when we want to analyse states in Africa, and especially Somalia.

**The spectral threat of nuclear war is itself part of a system of deterrence which neutralizes all events, including the real possibility of nuclear war. This is an implosive violence; the balance of terror is the terror of balance. That all things must be quilted through the nuclear issue marks its function as a simulacrum to conceal the death of politics**

**Baudrillard 81** (Jean Baudrillard, ask Jack, “Simulacra and Simulation,” pp 32-4)

The apotheosis of simulation: the nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never ¶ anything but the spectacular slope of a system of deterrence that has insinuated itself ¶ from the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal the ¶ trivialized system of deterrence that is at the heart of the media, of the violence without ¶ consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the ¶ choices that are made for us. The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated by ¶ neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signs like those that regulate the ¶ "strategy of games" (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that ¶ variable of simulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a ¶ simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all "ground-level" events to being ¶ nothing but ephemeral scenarios, transforming the life left us into survival, into a stake ¶ without stakes - not even into a life insurance policy: into a policy that already has no ¶ value). ¶ It is not the direct threat of atomic destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence ¶ that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes from that fact that even the real ¶ atomic clash is precluded - precluded like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. ¶ The whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on ¶ the part of the military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their "strategy" ¶ are at stake), but it is precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. The whole ¶ originality of the situation lies in the improbability of destruction.¶ Deterrence precludes war - the archaic violence of expanding systems. Deterrence itself ¶ is the neutral, implosive violence of metastable systems or systems in involution. There is ¶ no longer a subject of deterrence, nor an adversary nor a strategy - it is a planetary ¶ structure of the annihilation of stakes. Atomic war, like the Trojan War, will not take ¶ place. The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext, through the sophistication ¶ of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an extent that it ¶ is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing a universal security system, a universal ¶ lockup and control system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash ¶ (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the very initial stages of the cold ¶ war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at ¶ the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the ¶ general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is the terror of balance.¶ Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear protagonists ¶ exactly as is international capital in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose ¶ fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus the money of destruction ¶ (without any reference to real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real ¶ referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit suffices to control all the violence ¶ and potential conflicts around the world.¶ What is hatched in the shadow of this mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, ¶ "objective," threat, and thanks to Damocles' nuclear sword, is the perfection of the best ¶ system of control that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization of the whole ¶ planet through this hypermodel of security.¶ The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguish ¶ between the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control ¶ are elaborated, everywhere where the notion of security becomes omnipotent, ¶ everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including ¶ war), it is the system of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, ¶ and political desert. A gigantic involution that makes every conflict, every finality, every ¶ confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that interrupts, neutralizes, freezes ¶ them all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic ¶ because it risks annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a ¶ puerile game given over to the military. The political stake is dead, only simulacra of ¶ conflicts and carefully circumscribed stakes remain.

## 2NC

### Campbell

The process of international cooperation is a violent search for rational certainty which uses a technology of control to produce unnatural stability in the international arena – it replicates violence

Burke, 7 - Senior lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales (Anthony, “1. Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, 2007)

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking - and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer - was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule - over numerous societies and billions of human beings - as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 41. We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said

Their desire for cooperation is based on a discourse of danger which attempts to remedy insecurity via integration and intervention into zones of conflict

Campbell, 7 - International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University (David, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy” 2007)

Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways ‘‘the world is’’ and, in so doing, **actively (re)- making that same world**. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies speciﬁcally with the ways in which the US portrays e and over the past decade has portrayed certain parts of the world **as requiring involvement**, as **threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, ‘‘states of concern’’, as ‘‘global hotspots’’**, as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within th**e ‘‘integrated’’ zones of democratic peace,** US security e both economically and militarily e can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat.

Furthermore the ideology of international engagement requires incessant American intervention in the name of inclusion – the flipside to this coin is radical exclusion and violence

Campbell, 7 - International Boundaries Research Unit, Geography Department, Durham University (David, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy” 2007)

As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush’s claim of ‘‘either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’’ (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush’s most enthusiastic supporters, ‘‘shoulder to shoulder’’ (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: ‘‘If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and ﬁrmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state’’ (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the signiﬁcance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush’s notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that ‘‘states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world’’ (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the ‘‘with the terrorists’’ is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration. These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an Americancentric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reﬂection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe’s ‘‘Old’’ and ‘‘New’’ e a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPGethe dissent of (even some) Europeansis a problem for the USinits world-making endeavours (seeBialasiewicz &Minca, 2005). Itis not surprising, then, that following his re-election, GeorgeW. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a ‘‘bridge-building’’ tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but ‘‘the great alliance of freedom’’ that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).

### Link

**Don’t evaluate apocalypse – replace your view of *war as event* with *war as presence* – otherwise the militarization of society will consume the planet**

**Cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination

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and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

### AT: Perm

**And, the permutation is merely the same attempt to continue the western frame of thinking. The attempt at making minor epistemic adjustments via reforms is not enough. We need a radical epistemological re-evaluation.**

**Deloria 1999** [Vine, For this land p 101]

But this replacement only begins the task ofliberation. For the history of Western thinking in the past eight centuries has been one of replacement of ideas within a framework that has remained basically unchanged for nearly two millenia. Challenging this framework of interpretation means a rearrangement of our manner of perceiving the world, and it involves a reexamination of the body of human knowledge and its structural reconstruction into a new format. Such a task appears to be far from the struggles of the present. It seems abstract and meaningless in the face of contemporary suffering. And it suggests that people can be made to change their oppressive activity by intellectual reorientation alone. All these questions arise, however, because of the fundamental orientation of Western peoples toward the world. We assume that we know the structure of reality and must only make certain minor adjustments in the machinery that operates it in order to bring our institutions into line. Immediate suffering is thus placed in juxtaposition with abstract metaphysical conceptions of the world and, because we can see immediate Suffering, we feel impelled to change conditions quickly to relieve tensions, never coming to understand how the basic attitude toward life and its derivative attitudes toward minority groups continues to dominate the goals and activities that appear designed to create reforms.

### AT: Neolib

**Neolib causes poverty and isn’t inevitable**

Dr. Ronn **Pineo**, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Towson University – Posted on April 11, 20**13** - See more at: http://www.coha.org/22227/#sthash.L5CsywQs.dpuf

Poverty in Latin America has been reduced substantially in the last three decades. In the late 1980s, nearly half of Latin America’s population lived in poverty. Today the fraction is about a third. [21] This marks important progress, and it has continued in some area nations. However, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2008, poverty contracted most in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina, countries which had largely **abandoned neoliberalism**; in Brazil, which had at least partially rejected neoliberalism; and in only two other states, Honduras and Perú, which still remained, at least partially, committed to free market polices. [22] It was mostly factors **beyond economic policy** that helps to account for recent declines in the rate of Latin American poverty. One factor was increasing remittances from Latin Americans laboring in the developed world, especially in the United States. Total remittances from Latin American workers rose from $12 billion USD in 1995, to $45 billion in 2004, and $68 billion in 2006. [23] However, “by far the main contributor to the reduction in the poverty rate,” as Jaime Ros has noted, was “the fall in the dependency ratio.” [24] The indicator measures the number of non-working age people—children and the elderly—who are supported by the working age population. The higher the dependency number, the greater the economic burden. Source: foreignpolicyblogs.com Latin America’s past demographic history underlies this shift in the dependency ratio. The late 1940s in Latin America witnessed lower overall death rates (the number of people who died a year divided by the total population), especially due to lower infant and childhood mortality rates. Initially, birth rates stayed high even as death rates fell, but after a generation passed Latin America’s birth rates began to drift downward to match the lower death rates. The time gap between the fall in death rates beginning in the late 1940s and the eventual fall in birth rates by the late 1970s resulted in an unprecedented population explosion. Latin America’s population rose from 167 million in 1950 to 285 million by 1970. As this population cohort has aged, Latin America’s dependency ratio fell too, dropping from a very high rate of 87.3 in the years 1965-1970, to 55.0 for 2005-2010, an all-time low for the region. The people born during the population explosion are of working age now, bringing the region a historic but one-time economic advantage, the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend.” As a result, Latin America temporarily enjoys a situation of a very large number of workers providing for a greatly reduced number of dependent people. The region’s demographic bonus means that there is, for the moment, less poverty due, in large part, to the increased number of working age people per household. [25] A drop in the dependency ratio carries with it greater female participation in the workforce, for lower fertility means there are fewer children to care for, freeing women to enter the paid workforce. Lower fertility also means better overall lifetime health for women, resulting in more years spent in the paid workforce for adult females. The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman per year) fell in Latin America from 5.6 for the years from 1965 to1970, to 2.4 for the years 2005 to 2010. The resulting demographic bonus has provided a significant, but fleeting, economic asset. By 2025, as the current population ages, Latin America will need to support a very large elderly dependent population. [26] It is fair to conclude that the reduction of poverty in Latin America in recent years was produced mainly by some short-term victories in the commodity lottery (as explained in Part I, the commodity lottery refers to short-term price rises for selected raw material exports), as well as a spike in remittances, and most of all, a one-time reduction in the dependency ratio. Income inequality data for Latin America is less positive. In the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased significantly in Latin America. For example, from 1984 to 1994, the income of the top 10 percent of the Mexico’s population rose by 21 percent, while the income of the country’s bottom 10 percent fell by 23 percent. Nevertheless, there have been improvements, albeit modest ones, in lowering the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality with 0 being the least inequality—everyone has the same income, and 1.0 being the most inequality—one person has all the income). Source: norlarnet.uio.no From 2002 to 2008, the Gini coefficient improved in seven Latin American states; five of these seven countries—Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—have traveled the farthest in rejecting neoliberalism. Outside of these nations inequality stayed the same or even increased, including in the largely neoliberal states of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Latin Americans earned 363 times more than the poorest 1 percent. By 1995, it was 417 times more. Latin America continues to show, by far, the greatest income inequality of any region in the world. Of the 15 most unequal economies in the world today, 10 are in the area. If Latin America’s income were only as unevenly distributed as that of Eastern Europe or South Asia, its recent economic growth, though sometimes anemic, would have reduced the percentage of those living in poverty to 3 percent of the population. [27] The Economist, in its 2010 review of the Latin American economic situation, concluded that the region was “well on the way to building middle-class societies.” [28] The evidence, however, contradicts this assertion. The informal sector—where people arrange irregular employment in itinerant retail sales, as day workers, or other loosely arranged jobs—today accounts for more than half of all workers in Latin America. More than eight of ten new jobs in Latin America are in the informal sector. [29] Informal sector workers enjoy no protective regulation or benefits. They live by their wits, striving to scratch out a living, day by day. Meanwhile, union membership among active workers in Latin America fell from around one-fourth in the 1980s to under one-sixth in the 1990s. Source: laht.com Moreover, significant areas of severe poverty remain in Latin America, expressed along class, racial, gender, and regional divides Poverty underlies poor health, contributing to elevated rates of infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. Of those living in poverty in Latin America, nearly half are children. Due to their undernourishment, a quarter of Latin American children (and as many as half in rural Perú and Guatemala) are stunted in their development. Across Latin America malnutrition is an underlying cause in more than half of the deaths of children under the age of five. In Guatemala maternal mortality among indigenous women is 83 percent higher than the national average. Among the poorest fifth of the Perú’s population, 85 percent of births are not attended by trained personnel, compared to only 4 percent among the wealthiest fifth. Two-thirds of Latin American municipalities do not treat their sewage prior to dumping it into adjacent rivers or the sea. In Panamá, three in ten homes lack access to improved sanitation (sewage disposal), and in Perú, nearly four in ten lack this essential service. Yet with all this effluvium flowing out, still three-quarters of Latin America municipalities do not check public drinking water supplies for impurities. One-quarter of Latin Americans do not have in-home potable water. [30] In Latin America nearly two-thirds of hospital admissions are due to diseases related to the lack of sanitation. Diarrhea accounts for six of every ten deaths of children under the age of five in Latin America. Fresh water can save lives; for each percentage point increase in potable water coverage, the infant mortality rate drops 1 death per 1,000 live births. Yet, Latin America is falling behind in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy in Latin America was five years longer than East Asia in the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1990s, it was 1.2 years shorter. [31] The weight of this evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it most succinctly, “Over the last three decades, economists…provid[ed]…theoretical justifications for financial deregulation and the unrestrained pursuit of short-term profits…[T]hey advanced theories that justified the policies that have led to slower growth…[and] higher inequality…[**E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant. Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been positively harmful for most people**.” [32] The Twilight of Neoliberalism “There is no alternative [to free market policies],” the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once pronounced, but across Latin America, there has been a steady erosion of support for the free market model. At present three-quarters of Latin America governments can be fairly characterized as being governed by center-left or left-oriented leaders. Moreover, there has been a far-reaching reassessment of the relevance of IMF advice, especially after the organization’s punishingly controversial response to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The Asian economic meltdown brought the reflexive recommendations from the IMF in the form of harsh austerity measures. However, the pro-cyclical policies demanded by the IMF of its client states so plainly worsened the economic situation and needlessly caused considerable human misery that the IMF’s reputation was badly damaged. In the wake of IMF’s subsequent mishandling of the 1998 economic crises in Russia and Brazil, large private lenders, especially among the European ones, stopped requiring IMF assurances that borrowing nations follow neoliberal strictures. As Richard Peet has noted, “the…[IMF]’s reputation has never recovered, even in circles that the Fund values. [...] The power of the IMF has been reduced by failed crisis management, [with] countries paying up as quickly as possible and distancing themselves” from the IMF. [33] European lenders concluded that new loans to non-neoliberal Latin American states would perform handsomely, which, in fact, they have. The IMF’s power to impose neoliberal policies on debtor nations has been seriously compromised. Source: herslookingatyousquid.worldpress.com Argentina, following its severe economic crisis in 2001-2002, proved that a nation could successfully challenge the IMF. Argentina defaulted on its $100 billion USD foreign debt and renegotiated its obligations, paying off its loans at a fraction of the original cost. Buenos Aires finished retiring its debt to the IMF in 2005, benefitting greatly from Venezuelan assistance. In offering the money, the late Hugo Chávez promised that, “if additional help is needed to help Argentina finally free itself from the claws of the International Monetary Fund, Argentina can count on us.” [34] Other Latin American nations looked on as Argentina defied the IMF, and continued to watch as Argentina’s economy soared, growing faster than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere after it abandoned IMF-imposed economic policies. Soon a stampede of those flouting IMF mandates followed, with each new defection providing courage to all those nations rejecting neoliberalism. Other international lenders appeared as well. Venezuela loaned money to other countries in the region, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, but only if they ignored the counsel of the IMF. The Bank of the South, established in 2007, joined Venezuela with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay as an alternative source for credit. China, which does not particularly care what the IMF recommends, is also supplying capital. Furthermore, some primary commodity export prices have increased, in part due to the demand for Chinese imports (for example, Argentine soya). This has allowed several Latin American states to build up their financial reserves, making new foreign borrowing less pressing. Today the IMF can coerce only the most feeble economies, mainly now in sub-Sahara Africa. The political landscape has shifted too. By the late 1990s, many of the aging left-wing political parties built around organized labor had been flattened by the assault on unions mounted under neoliberalism. At first voters were willing to give candidates who supported the neoliberal program a chance; nevertheless, as it became increasingly clear that these policies were failing, those who spoke out against neoliberalism were elected in growing numbers. The trouble was that once in office they too often carried out neoliberal programs anyway, as for example with Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) or Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) in Ecuador, either because they secretly favored such policies, because the IMF persuaded them to do so, or both. With the traditional left-leaning parties marginalized in several countries and the abandonment of anti-neoliberal promises by elected politicians, ordinary citizens had to develop new political methods to defend themselves. Neoliberal policies so savaged the working class, as well as the urban marginalized and the hard-pressed peasantry, that they had no choice but to organize and fight back. To this end, they created new organizations and, in some cases, used them to seize power. By pressing the neoliberal agenda, the Latin American élites appeared to have overplayed their hand, and they paid for it by losing control of governments that they had controlled for many years, in **Venezuela**, Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond. A 2009 Latinobarómetro Survey found that support for democracy (as preferable to all other forms of government) was the strongest in countries that flatly rejected neoliberalism. Of the top five nations in popular support of democracy, four were governed by progressive leaders: Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, and El Salvador. [35] Hope for the Future? Supporters of the free market approach have continued to counsel patience. They argue that stronger economic growth will eventually come, and that all will benefit in the long run. While neoliberal reforms might cause some short-term belt tightening, defenders explain that such adjustments, though sometimes painful, are necessary for the greatest good. We should not give in to “reform fatigue,” but should stay the course. [36] But neoliberal policies have been in place for over 30 years now. How long is the long run? How long must we wait? As John Maynard Keynes famously observed, “In the long run we are all dead.” In 1937 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed, “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals. We know now that it is bad economics.” [37] The age of neoliberalism is ending. It is time for some good economics.

### AT: Disease

**The fear of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”**

**Gomel 2000** (Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

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### FW

**Situatedness determines political efficacy**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**Their framework causes passivity**

**Antonio 95** (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

**5. Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

A solely political view of debate masks the true nature of the world and makes aff solvency impossible

Smith**,** professor of political science at the University of Wales,97(Steve, Review of International Studies, Cambridge journals online)

By focusing on the policy debate, we restrict ourselves to the issues of the day, to the tip of the political iceberg. What politics seems to me to be crucially about is how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface (being defined as ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ or ‘private’). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the ‘buzz’ that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we ‘know’ things about the international political world. My main claim is that International Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question, namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable, especially when positivism’s commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my view this is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very *political* view of knowledge, born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; crucially the normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to ‘speak truth to power’. For these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write on epistemology. Maybe that does not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate; but I believe that my work helps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates. In short, I think that Wallace’s view of politics ignores its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works. My work enquires into how the current ‘politics’ get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence, how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm of politics is itself the result of a prior series of (political) epistemological moves which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense.

Their framework destroys agency and makes violence inevitable

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

`We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens - even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all**,** any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what *I could* do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

Simulation through scenario planning legitimizes global war

Graham 11

Cities Under Siege:

The New Military Urbanism

Professor Stephen Graham

Prof of Cities & Society, Newcastle University

Meanwhile, within the US, dozens of physical simulations of US city districts are joining the simulations of Arab cities. These are the places where lawenforcement and National Guard personnel practise operations against civil unrest, terrorist attack and natural disaster. 'Another architecture is rising in the expanding landscape of preparedness', notes the Center for Land Use Interpretation. 'Condensed simulacra of our existing urban environments are forming within our communities, where the first responders to emergencies, on a small or large scale, practice their craft of dealing with disaster [and where] the police contend with civil decay, robberies, hostage situations, looting, riots, and snipers'."' Military simulations are also helping to produce US cities in another, more direct, way: generating them now takes up large swaths of the US economy, especially in high-tech metropolitan areas. Many of the much-vaunted high-tech suburban hot spots that house what Richard Florida has called the 'creative class'"5 of the US - places such as Washington, DC's 'Beltway', North Carolina's 'Research Triangle', Florida's 'High Tech Corridor', or San Diego's 'clean tech cluster' - are in fact heavily sustained by the production of symbolic violence against both US central and Arab cities. Being not only the foundries of the security state but also the sites of the most militarized and corporatized research universities, these locations are where the vastly profitable and rapidly growing convergence between electronic games and military simulation is being forged. Orlando's hundred large militarysimulator firms, for example, generate about seventeen thousand jobs and are starting to overshadow even Disney as local economic drivers. Behind the blank facades and manicured lawns, thousands of software engineers and games professionals project their Orientalized electronic imaginaries onto the world through the increasingly seamless complex of military, entertainment, media and academic industries. The importance of military simulation industries is not lost on those tasked with the development of local urban economies. The municipality of Suffolk, Virginia, for instance, now proudly claims that a 'world-class cluster of "Modeling and Simulation" enterprises has taken root around the US Joint Forces Command and an Old Dominion University research center' (Figure 6.12)'16 To support further growth in these sectors, partnerships beween local governments and economic developers are springing up to determine 'how the state of Virginia could better support JFCOM [Joint Forces Command] and its mission! This economic convergence gains strength from the Virginia Modeling and Simulation Initiative (VIMSIM), which will be geared to 'stimulate development of a unique high-tech industry with multi-billion dollar revenue potential.' Already, Lockheed Martin has opened a major simulation complex in the area. 'As a growing high technology hub with proximity to major defense, homeland security and other important customer installations', Lockheed Martins CEO, Vance Cotfman, pointed out in 2003, 'Suffolk is the ideal location for our new center'."7 SELF-FULFILLING WORLDS All efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing - war."\* The complex constellation of simulations of Arab and global South cities discussed here work powerfully as a collective. The various physical, electronic and blended physical-electronic manifestations operate together, as do all simulacra, by collapsing reality with artifice, so that any simple boundary between the two effectively disappears."' In keeping with what Jean Baudrillard famously stressed, it is best to consider the above simulations, not as 'copies' of the 'real' world, but as hyperreal constructions - simulations of things that don't exist - through which war and violence are constructed, legitimized, and performed. 'Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance', Baudrillard writes, 'It is the generation by models of a real without origins or reality: a hyperreal'.120 The point, then, is not that these simulations are less 'real' than the things they purportedly represent. Rather, they provide spaces through which the violence of the 'War on Terror' can be generated and performed, and which acquire their power from their radical disassociation from any meaningful connection with the real places (or, less commonly, real people) they are said to represent. In the process, these simulacra 'participate in the construction of a discourse of security which is self-fulfilling'.111 Multiple layers and circuits of simulation work collectively to evacuate the possibility of authenticating what might actually be 'real'. 'Since 9/11', writes James Der Derian, 'simulations (war games, training exercises, scenario planning, and modeling) and dissimulations (propaganda, disinformation, infowar, deceit, and lies) [have produced] a hall of mirrors, reducing the "truth" about the "Global War on Terror" to an infinite regression of representations that [defy] authentication.''22 Because the worlds of threat and risk are projected through this simulacral collective, the perpetration of state violence and colonial war emerge from the same collective as necessary, just and honourable. More simulations are rendered necessary in turn to improve the effectiveness of such violence, to tempt and train more recruits, to deal with their psychological devastation once they return home, and so on. It follows that the very notion of 'security', at least as constructed through the military simulacral collective, becomes possible only through permanent war. 'War makes security possible by creating that which is to be protected', writes Abhinava Kumar, 'and what makes war possible [is the] mechanization of soldiers, the obscuring of the enemy and the sanitisation of violence.'113 The mcdiatization of contemporary war is such that the 'fighting' of actual wars takes place as much in TV lounges, at multiplexes, and on YouTube or PlayStation screens as in the real streets and alleys of combatzone cities. As already-vague distinctions between civil and military media and technology dissolve, the military simulacral collective comes to permeate a host of media simultaneously. Previously considered to be largely distinct, multiple media domains are thus in the process of The mediatization of contemporary war is such that the fighting of actual wars takes place as much in TV lounges, at multiplexes, and on YouTube or PlayStation screens as in the real streets and alleys of combatzone cities. As already-vague distinctions between civil and military media and technology dissolve, the military simulacral collective comes to permeate a host of media simultaneously. Previously considered to be largely distinct, multiple media domains are thus in the process of fusing and interpenetrating within and through the military simulacral collective - a process at once confusing, disturbing and extremely fast moving. 'We see that various genres once thought to be discrete are forging new and strange alliances', writes Roger Stahl. As a result, 'wartime news looks like a video game; video games restage the news. Official military training simulators cross over into the commercial entertainment markets; commercial video games are made useful for military training exercises. Advertisements sell video games with patriotic rhetorics; video games arc mobilized to advertise patriotism. The business of play works closely with the military to replicate the tools of state violence; the business of state violence in turn capitalizes on playtime for institutional ends\*124

**There is no internal link between the plan text and the solvency.**

**Schlag 90** (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)

In fact, **normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it.** For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? **Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics** and perhaps a few law students -- **persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.**

### AT: Util

Utilitarian problem solving justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### AT: No Root Cause

Their no root cause arguments white out colonialism – separating conditions for violence is an attempt to make them more invisible – the impact is extinction

Nhanenge 07 (Jytte Nhanenge, MA in development studies at the University of South Africa, February 2007, “Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,” page 90-1)

The four crises are difficult to resolve individually because they are interlinked and they therefore reinforce each other. Wars usually give the effect of poverty, environmental damage and repression. Poverty often results in environmental damage and can lead to revolts and repression. Destruction of nature causes poverty, social upheaval and repression. Abuses of human's rights are entangled in all of the other crises. In addition and paradoxically, mainstream development activities, meant to ameliorate poverty in the South, often also lead to environmental damage, human's rights abuses, increased poverty and violence. Thus, the four crises function in a web-like fashion and are difficult to ameliorate individually. Should positive changes be made it is necessary to look beyond a treatment of each crisis towards a more fundamental process of overall healing. Hence, the crises may more correctly be seen as a symptom of a more fundamental systemic "dis-ease". (Ekins 1992: 13). Hazel Henderson (Capra 1989: 248) agrees with Ekins. The major problems of our time cannot be understood in isolation. Whether a crisis manifests itself as poverty, environmental degradation, war or human rights abuses does not matter. The underlying dynamics are the same. Thus, the crises are interconnected, interdependent and all are rooted in a larger systemic crisis. Each crisis is therefore only a different aspect of the same crisis: a crisis of perception. It derives from the fact that the Western world subscribes to an outdated, reductionist world-view. Modern science, technology, government structures, development agencies and academic institutions are all using a fragmented methodology, which has proven to be inadequate in dealing with a systemically interconnected world. Thus, many scientifically educated people cannot understand and hence resolve systemic crises. Most leaders also fail to see that the problems are inter-linked. They therefore cannot recognize that their preferred reductionist economic solutions have disastrous consequences elsewhere in the social and natural system. The main aim for politicians, economists and development experts is to maximize economic growth, but they cannot perceive that this negatively affects women, Others, nature and future generations. (Capra 1982: 6; Capra 1997: 3-4). 2.6.1. Modernity; a reductionist perception of realityRichard B. Norgaard has arrived at a similar conclusion in his book "Development betrayed; the end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future". He argues that the reasons behind the environmental crises relates to the Western philosophy of life. A good life is seen to be modern and progressive. Modernity promised that humanity with its superior science could control nature that all could have material abundance through scientific technology and that life could be administered effectively by rational social organisation. The combination would lead to peace on Earth where all would be part of the new, collective, modern culture. However, modernity betrayed development. Instead of unity, it led to material madness, inequalities, depletion of natural resources, degradation of the environment, increase in number of wars and refugees and a bureaucratic deadlock where governments cannot find rational solutions to the crises. (Norgaard 1994: 1-2). The problem is that modernism is based on some false beliefs about scientific technology, social structure and environmental interaction. It is assumed that progress will come about as a linear process. Thus improved science will promote improved technology, which leads to better rational social organisation, and increased material well-being. This is perceived as an eternal activity, all determined by science. However, such a view is too simple. Progress cannot continue forever since the means, our natural resources, are finite. We do not have an eternal source of energy, with which economists seem to calculate. Thus in the name of progress we are depleting our natural resources and destroying the planet Earth. In the end, modernity's progress will terminate our existence. (Norgaard 1994: 32-34, 54-56). More fundamentally, the crises relate to the philosophical premises underlying the Western metaphysical and epistemological world-view. Norgaard (1994: 62) calls them for atomism, mechanism, universalism, objectivism and monism. In brief, they translate reality as follows: Systems (for example social or natural ones) consist of unchanging parts, the sum of which equals the whole. The relationship between the parts is fixed and possible changes are reversible. Although systems may be diverse and complex, they all are based on a limited number of underlying universal laws, which are unchanging and eternal. These laws can be understood by observing the systems from the outside. The knowledge derived at is objective and universal. Hence, this is the only one way to understand systems. When a system's laws are known, its actions can be predicted and the system can be controlled. In this way, the system can be manipulated to benefit human beings. (Norgaard 1994: 6266).